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Article

Soft Law as Governing Law
Steven L. Schwarcz†
INTRODUCTION
Commercial, financial, and other international business
transactions increasingly are conducted1 under “soft law” rules.2
Some argue “we are witnessing the twilight of the traditional
regulatory system and its gradual replacement by an amorphous
and constantly evolving set of informal ‘soft law’ governance

† Stanley A. Star Professor of Law & Business, Duke University School
of Law; Senior Fellow, the Centre for International Governance Innovation
(CIGI). The author thanks José Enrique Alvarez, Henry Gabriel, Ralf Michaels,
Alex Mills, Joost Pauwelyn, John A.E. Pottow, Geneviève Saumier, Michael
Simkovic, Symeon Symeonides, and participants in a faculty workshop at Elon
University School of Law for excellent comments and Ryan Arredondo and Kris
Liu for valuable research assistance. Although the author is independently
leading a CIGI inquiry into using soft law as governing law, the views expressed
in this Article are entirely his own. See infra note 13 and accompanying text.
Copyright © 2020 by Steven L. Schwarcz.
1. Cf. infra note 12 and accompanying text (explaining different ways in
which a transaction could be conducted under soft-law rules).
2. See generally GEORGES AFFAKI & SIR ROY GOODE, GUIDE TO ICC UNIFORM RULES FOR DEMAND GUARANTEES URDG 758, at vi (2011) (observing that
the “percentage of guarantees subject to URDG 758 [soft law in the form of the
ICC’s Uniform Rules for Demand Guarantees] is increasing by the day and at a
very satisfactory rate”); ABRAHAM L. NEWMAN & ELLIOTT POSNER, VOLUNTARY
DISRUPTIONS: INTERNATIONAL SOFT LAW, FINANCE, AND POWER (2018) (examining the global economy’s increasing reliance on soft law). The UN’s Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, promulgated by a non-binding General Assembly
resolution in 1948, is a highly influential example of soft law, having influenced
several later human rights treaties. See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948).
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mechanisms.”3 The University of Michigan Law School recently
held an international conference to explore this phenomenon.4
Although not well-defined,5 soft law generally refers to nonstate rules that may be aspirational or reflect best practices but
are not yet legally enforceable.6 For this reason, soft law sometimes is called non-state law.7 It contrasts with standard, or
“hard,” law, which is legally enforceable.8 The shift to soft law
responds, at least in part, to the growing difficulty of adopting
international treaties.9
3. Ryan Hagemann et al., Soft Law for Hard Problems: The Governance of
Emerging Technologies in an Uncertain Future, 17 COLO. TECH. L.J. 37, 37
(2018).
4. Univ. of Mich. Law Sch., Conference, Soft Law in International Insolvency and Commercial Law (Sept. 21–22, 2018) [hereinafter Michigan Law Conference]. The author participated in this conference as a Distinguished
Fellow.
5. The author observed profound disagreement at the Michigan Law Conference about what “soft law” precisely means. Id.
6. This reflects the author’s perception of the consensus of the conference
participants. See Dinah Shelton, Soft Law, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 68, 69 (David Armstrong ed., Routledge 2009), (observing that many varieties of soft law are “non-binding normative instruments [that] emerge from the
work of international organizations, which in most instances lack the power to
adopt binding measures”); supra note 5. Common examples of soft law “include
normative resolutions of international organizations, concluding texts of summit meetings or international conferences, recommendations of treaty bodies
overseeing compliance with treaty obligations, bilateral or multilateral memoranda of understanding, executive political agreements, and guidelines or codes
of conduct adopted in a variety of contexts.” Shelton, supra, at 4.
7. E.g., Ralf Michaels, Non-State Law in the Hague Principles on Choice
of Law in International Commercial Contracts, in VARIETIES OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC LAW AND REGULATION: LIBER AMICORUM FOR HANS MICKLITZ 43, 43–69
(Kai Purnhagen & Peter Rott eds., 2014) (discussing soft law and non-state law
interchangeably).
8. The terminology can be even more confusing because the term “‘[r]ules
of law,’ as opposed to ‘law,’ has traditionally been understood to include nonstate law.” Id. at 44. To minimize confusion, this Article will not use that term.
9. See infra Part I. Other reasons for the shift to soft law are more subtle.
See Joost Pauwelyn et al., When Structures Become Shackles: Stagnation and
Dynamics in International Lawmaking, 25 EUR. J. INT’L L. 733, 743 (2014) (arguing that other reasons for the shift to soft law include “the emergence of an
increasingly diverse and complex network/knowledge society [that] is transforming the actors, processes, and outputs at work or required to deliver international cooperation”); cf. E-mail from Alex Mills, Professor of Pub. & Private
Int’l Law, Univ. Coll. of London Faculty of Laws, to author (Jan. 8, 2019) (on
file with author) (observing that soft law sometimes is developed through an
industry-led bottom-up process in which industry prefers to avoid state control,
as would occur under a treaty framework).
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Whatever its cause, the shift is creating uncertainty because
soft law’s unenforceability undermines predictability.10 To increase predictability, this Article argues for an innovative use of
soft law: as a set of rules to choose as all or part of the governing
“law” of business contracts.11 If respected, this use of soft law
would be transformational: making the soft law enforceable
against the parties and providing a flexible and practical alternative to treaty-making.
The analysis focuses, first, on whether parties should have
the contractual right to choose soft law to govern their business
transactions. Thereafter, the analysis focuses on an alternative:
incorporating soft law merely by reference into contracts.12 To
10. See, e.g., Robin Creyke, ‘Soft Law’ and Administrative Law: A New
Challenge, 61 AIAL F. 15, 18 (2010) (arguing that including unenforceable softlaw rules together with enforceable mandatory requirements in “one document
with little distinction made between compliance obligations” can “lead to confusion and higher costs, and ultimately to litigation to resolve these uncertainties”); see also José E. Alvarez, Reviewing the Use of “Soft Law” in Investment
Arbitration, 7.2 EUR. INT’L ARB. REV. 149, 149 (2018) (“Everything about ‘soft
law’ is controversial.”).
11. See HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW, PRINCIPLES ON
CHOICE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS cmt. ¶ 1.18 (2015)
[hereinafter HAGUE PRINCIPLES], https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/
conventions/full-text/?cid=135 [https://perma.cc/4PL3-VA8P] (observing that allowing parties to use soft law as governing law would be “novel”); Lauro Gama,
Jr. & Geneviève Saumier, Non-State Law in the (Proposed) Hague Principles on
Choice of Law in International Contracts, in EL DERECHO INTERNACIONAL
PRIVADO EN LOS PROCESOS DE INTEGRACIÓN REGIONAL 41, 50 (Diego P. Fernández Arroyo & Juan José Obando Peralta eds., 2011) (observing that allowing the
designation of non-state law outside of arbitration contracts “would be innovative for virtually all legal systems”). Professor Michaels calls this a “revolution
in choice of law for contracts” and a “novelty” for state courts. Michaels, supra
note 7, at 43.
12. Business transactions could be conducted under soft-law rules in at
least two other ways: in the “shadow” of soft-law rules, or with the soft law
forming the basis of enactment of hard law, which governs the transaction. Cf.
NEWMAN & POSNER, supra note 2, at 35–37 (offering the Basel Committee’s capital-adequacy standards, the macroprudential regulatory recommendations of
the Financial Stability Board (FSB), and the master agreements of the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) as examples of soft law governing financial and business transactions; whereas these examples more precisely are of soft-law rules that have been enacted into hard law, in the case of
Basel and the FSB, and of privately negotiated model forms of contracts, in the
case of ISDA). Conducting transactions in the shadow of those rules represents
influence, not law per se. Conducting transactions under hard law based on soft
law represents a time-honored and uncontroversial function of soft law that includes all uniform lawmaking in the United States, including, for example, the
work of the private-sector American Law Institute and National Conference of
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provide real-world grounding, the Article links its analysis to a
parallel inquiry by the Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), an “independent, non-partisan think tank with
an objective” perspective.13 CIGI hopes to facilitate the restructuring of unsustainable sovereign debt by persuading parties to
choose its sovereign-debt-restructuring model law (the Model
Law)14 to include as part of their sovereign-debt contracts’ governing law.15 The Model Law is a set of soft-law rules, not yet
enacted into law by any governmental body.16 As an alternative,
CIGI is considering persuading those parties to merely incorporate the Model Law by reference into their contracts.17
Historically, the contractual right to choose soft law as governing law has been narrowly restricted to arbitration.18 The
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL, or Uniform Laws Commission) in preparing a model text of the Uniform Commercial Code for enactment
by states. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of
Private Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 595 (1995).
13. See About CIGI, CTR. FOR INT’L GOVERNANCE INNOVATION, https://www
.cigionline.org/about [https://perma.cc/R3EX-PC7H].
14. See STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, CTR. FOR INT’L GOVERNANCE INNOVATION
POL’Y BRIEF NO. 64, A MODEL-LAW APPROACH TO RESTRUCTURING UNSUSTAINABLE SOVEREIGN DEBT, app. at 5–7 (2017), https://www.cigionline.org/sites/
default/files/documents/PB%20no.64%20Updated_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/
M4U3-2EVU] (providing the codified text of the Model Law).
15. The author thanks Professor Hans Tjio of National University of Singapore Faculty of Law for originally suggesting this possible approach. Assume,
for example, that the parties choose the Model Law as part of their sovereign
debt contract’s governing law, and that their contract is otherwise intended to
be governed by New York law. The governing law clause might then state that
the contract “is governed by New York law and the Model Law; in the event of
a conflict, the Model Law will govern.” See infra note 30 and accompanying text
(explaining why the right to choose soft law as governing law should include the
right to choose that soft law as all or part of the governing law). Parties could
include such a governing law clause in new contracts and, by amendment, also
in existing contracts.
16. CIGI’s ideal goal is to persuade governments to enact the Model Law as
their national law. See infra notes 53–54 and accompanying text. If and when
such enactment occurs, the Model Law would be an international model law
from the perspective of governments so enacting it, and soft law from the perspective of other governments. See infra Part I.
17. The author, a Senior Fellow of CIGI, is leading these soft-law-as-governing-law and incorporation-by-reference inquiries. See supra note †.
18. Arbitration is the out-of-court resolution of disputes by one or more impartial third parties, whose decision the disputing parties agree to accept.
SYMEON SYMEONIDES, CHOICE OF LAW 408 (2016) (“Although nonstate norms
long have been used in arbitration, they have not received legislative or judicial
sanction for use in litigation.”); see also id. at 487–88 (noting that parties may
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non-arbitration precedents are few.19 The Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC) provides a possible U.S. precedent,20 allowing parties to vary its provisions by “stating that their relationship will
be governed by recognized bodies of rules or principles applicable
to commercial transactions.”21 That recognition requirement restricts the choice to soft law promulgated “by intergovernmental
authorities such as UNCITRAL or Unidroit” or to trade codes
such as the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary
Credits (UCP), a codification of customs and practice governing

choose to have arbitrators apply non-state substantive and/or procedural law
“drafted by private nongovernmental bodies without any popular participation
or approbation, and [expressing] the views and predilections of those who draft
them”); Geneviève Saumier, Designating the UNIDROIT Principles in International Dispute Resolution, 17 UNIF. L. REV. 533, 538 (2012) (“The exception [i.e.,
choosing soft law as the choice of law] is reserved to the arbitral setting, where
it is now generally accepted that non-State law can govern the parties’ contract
and provide the substantive rules for the resolution of disputes between the
parties.”).
19. See Gama, Jr. & Saumier, supra note 11, at 50 (recognizing the novelty
of designating non-state law in contexts other than arbitration contracts).
20. The reservation that this is merely a “possible” U.S. precedent reflects
ambiguity whether the above-quoted text contemplates a choice of soft law or
merely an incorporation of soft law by reference. Infra note 21 and accompanying text. The argument for the latter is that UCC § 1-301 addresses choice of
law—or at least, choice of hard law—and thus UCC § 1-302 must address something else. Cf. E-mail from Geneviève Saumier, Peter M. Laing Q.C. Professor
of Law, McGill Univ. Faculty of Law, to author (Dec. 19, 2018) (on file with
author). For several reasons, this Article takes the position that the abovequoted text contemplates a choice of soft law. First, that text envisions the parties agreeing “that their relationship will be governed by recognized bodies of
rules or principles,” which is unequivocal choice-of-law language. See, e.g.,
HAGUE PRINCIPLES, supra note 11, cmt. ¶ 4.3 (observing that a statement that
a contract is “governed by” a particular law “meet[s] the requirements of an
express choice” of law). Second, there is no inherent contradiction between UCC
§ 1-301 addressing choice of hard law and UCC § 1-302 separately addressing
choice of soft law. Third, the UCC’s only example of parties implementing the
above-quoted language provides that the relevant body of soft law thereby becomes the “law of the transaction.” See U.C.C. § 5-101 cmt. (AM. LAW INST. &
UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). Finally, New York law provides that “a letter of credit
that incorporates the UCP is not governed in any respect by” state law. See id.
§ 5-116 cmt. 3 (referencing New York law related to this topic). That would
make sense only if the letter of credit incorporates the UCP as governing law,
not merely by reference; otherwise, the letter of credit would be a contract with
no governing law (contrat sans loi). See infra Part III.B.
21. U.C.C. § 1-302 cmt. 2 (“Variation by Agreement.”).
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international letters of credit.22 This precedent gives parties very
limited freedom to choose soft law as governing law.23
The only other non-arbitration precedent24 appears, incongruously, to be a provision of Paraguay law that allows parties
to international contracts to select “generally accepted” soft law
as governing law.25 That provision, however, follows the Hague
Principles on Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts (Hague Principles),26 a set of soft-law principles promulgated by the Hague Conference on Private International Law, an
intergovernmental organization.27 Although the Hague Principles do not purport to be legally binding,28 they favor the right of
parties to choose “rules” of soft law “that are generally accepted
on an international, supranational or regional level as a neutral
and balanced set of rules.”29

22. Id.; see also infra note 125 and accompanying text (discussing the UCP).
The UCP is one of the world’s most generally accepted bodies of commercial soft
law. See, e.g., Larry A. DiMatteo, Using Soft Law in International Commercial
Contract Arbitration, in CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL DISPUTE
RESOLUTION 58, 84 (Qiao Liu et al. eds., 2016).
23. Saumier, supra note 18, at 536.
24. The Rome I Regulation, setting EU conflict-of-laws rules, originally proposed allowing contracting parties to choose certain limited, internationally recognized, soft-law rules as governing law. Commission Proposal for a Regulation
of the European Parliament and the Council on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome I), at 14–15, COM (2005) 650 final (Dec. 12, 2005). However, that proposal was not ultimately adopted. See Regulation (EC) No.
593/2008, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the
Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome I), 2008 O.J. (L 177) 6, 10–11
(allowing incorporation by reference under Article 3 and Recital (13)).
25. Sobre el Derecho Aplicable a los Contratos Internacionales [Regarding
the Applicable Law to International Contracts Law] Ley No. 5393, art. 5 (2015)
(Para.), https://assets.hcch.net/upload/contractslaw_py.pdf.
26. See HAGUE PRINCIPLES, supra note 11.
27. About HCCH, HCCH, https://www.hcch.net/en/about [https://perma
.cc/2XSL-XREU]. For an excellent introduction to the Hague Principles, see
Symeon C. Symeonides, The Hague Principles on Choice of Law for International Contracts: Some Preliminary Comments, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 873 (2013).
The Hague Principles are accompanied by a commentary written by a working
group led by Professor Daniel Girsberger. Id. at 874–75.
28. Symeonides, supra note 27, at 874. The Hague Principles “can be seen
both as an illustration of how a comprehensive choice of law regime for giving
effect to party autonomy may be constructed and as a guide to ‘best practices’
in establishing and refining such a regime.” HAGUE PRINCIPLES, supra note 11,
cmt. ¶ 1.5.
29. HAGUE PRINCIPLES, supra note 11, art. 3 at 18.
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Accordingly, the few non-arbitration precedents for choosing
soft law as governing law are limited to soft law that either is
promulgated by a leading intergovernmental authority, generally accepted (or at least generally accepted as neutral and balanced), or a trade code. The limits to each of these precedents
implicitly require that the soft law chosen as governing law have
some degree of legitimacy.
This Article examines and goes beyond these limited precedents to analyze whether parties should be able to choose soft
law as governing law30 or, at least, incorporate such soft law by
reference. The analysis focuses on business contracting, which
not only is a core concern of private international law31 but also
addresses rights and obligations among private citizens of different countries.32 Part I discusses the rise of soft law and explains
why soft law is becoming an alternative to adopting international treaties. Part II then analyzes whether soft-law choice of
law should be enforceable. Thereafter, Part III compares incorporating soft law by reference into contracts and analyzes
whether that should be enforceable. Part IV applies the Article’s
proposed choice-of-law and incorporation-by-reference frameworks to CIGI’s Model Law, as an example of soft law. Finally,
Appendix A examines other possible applications of these frameworks to soft law.
Throughout, the Article strives to present its analysis based
on first principles, cutting through much of the opaque choice-oflaw jargon that has amassed over time. That should not only

30. All references in this Article to choosing soft law as governing law shall
encompass choosing soft law as all or part of the governing law. Cf. supra text
accompanying note 11 (stating that this Article argues for using soft law as a
set of rules to choose as “all or part of the governing ‘law’ of business contracts”).
If parties have the right to choose soft law as governing law, that right logically
should extend, as the parties specify, to all or just part of the contract—paralleling the right of parties to choose hard law as governing law for all or part of
their contract. See HAGUE PRINCIPLES, supra note 11, art. 2 at 18 (providing
that “parties may choose – (a) the law applicable to the whole contract or to only
part of it; and (b) different laws for different parts of the contract”).
31. Cf. Mathias Reimann, Savigny’s Triumph? Choice of Law in Contracts
Cases at the Close of the Twentieth Century, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 571, 594–95 (1999)
(observing that the modern framework of private international law, which was
developed by Friedrich Carl von Savigny, was largely centered around conflictof-laws rules for international contracts).
32. 2 JOSEPH H. BEALE, TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 1096 (1935).
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make the Article more accessible but also help to reveal insights
and connections long obscured by the jargon.33
I. THE RISE OF SOFT LAW
The rise of soft law responds, at least in part, to the increasing difficulty of adopting international treaties.34 A treaty or convention—the terms are synonymous—is a legal agreement or
compact among nations.35 The politics of a treaty, and the expectation that it needs a widespread consensus, can discourage its
adoption.36
For example, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) proposed a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM)
treaty for restructuring troubled sovereign debt.37 Although the
United States Treasury Secretary initially supported the
SDRM,38 he later shifted position due to lobbying by Wall
Street39 and certain emerging market countries,40 thereby assuring the SDRM’s demise. More recently, a majority of the members of the United Nations voted to begin work on a “multilateral

33. See, e.g., infra Part II.B (revealing the relationship between party autonomy and freedom of contracting).
34. See Joost Pauwelyn, Rule-Based Trade 2.0? The Rise of Informal Rules
and International Standards and How They May Outcompete WTO Treaties, 17
J. INT’L ECON. L. 739, 740–44 (2014) (discussing correlation between the rise in
soft law and stagnation in the formation of traditional treaty rules).
35. See Treaty, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
36. Cf. BRAD SETSER, INITIATIVE FOR POLICY DIALOGUE TASK FORCE ON
SOVEREIGN DEBT, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE SDRM 3 (2008), http://www
.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Setser_IPD_Debt_SDRM.pdf [https://
perma.cc/48YN-PEGU] (discussing the “profound difficulties [of] building international consensus behind any sweeping change in global financial regulation”).
37. IMF, PROPOSED FEATURES OF A SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING
MECHANISM (2003), https://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/sdrm/2003/021203
.pdf. The SDRM was the brainchild of IMF Deputy Managing Director Anne
Krueger, inspired by the works of Jeffrey Sachs, the author of this Article, and
others. See Kenneth Rogoff & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Bankruptcy Procedures for
Sovereigns: A History of Ideas, 1976–2001, 49 IMF STAFF PAPERS 470, 470–71,
490 (2002), http://www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/staffp/2002/03/pdf/rogoff.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R5X6-FXJW].
38. SETSER, supra note 36, at 1–2.
39. See Sean Hagan, Designing a Legal Framework to Restructure Sovereign Debt, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 299, 391–93 (2005) (arguing that the opposition to
SDRM by major financial industry associations was a critical factor behind the
U.S. reversal in position).
40. SETSER, supra note 36, at 16–17.
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legal framework” for sovereign debt restructuring.41 Claiming,
ironically, that the IMF is a more appropriate venue for this effort,42 the United States,43 and apparently also the European
Union,44 have opposed this approach. Absent U.S. and E.U. support, there is skepticism whether this U.N. effort is feasible—at
least in the near future.45
The formality of a treaty can also discourage its adoption.
Because of the lengthy negotiation process and their binding nature, treaties are not well suited to address an imminent or controversial global crisis.46
A model-law approach is sometimes attempted when treatymaking fails. In this context, a model law is proposed legislation,
having cross-border application, for governments to consider enacting as domestic law in their jurisdictions.47 To facilitate crossborder legal comparability, each government enacting a model

41. Press Release, Second Comm., Proposal for Sovereign Debt Restructuring Framework Among 6 Draft Texts Approved by Second Committee, U.N.
Press Release GA/EF/3417 (Dec. 5, 2014), http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/
gaef3417.doc.htm [https://perma.cc/BB5N-5HXY].
42. See supra notes 37–40 and accompanying text (discussing prior U.S.
opposition to the IMF’s proposed sovereign-debt-restructuring treaty).
43. Press Release, supra note 41 (“Also speaking before the vote, the representative of the United States was obliged to vote ‘no’ on the draft resolution as
there was ongoing work on the technically complex issue in such bodies as the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), which were more appropriate venues.”).
44. Italy, speaking on behalf of the European Union, stated that the IMF is
the “primary forum to discuss sovereign debt restructuring.” Id.
45. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A ModelLaw Approach, 6 J. GLOBALIZATION & DEV. 343, 353 (2016).
46. Dinah Shelton, Soft Law, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 68, 75 (David Armstrong ed., 2009); cf. Geneviève Saumier, The
Hague Principles and the Choice of Non-State “Rules of Law” to Govern an International Commercial Contract, 40 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1, 7 (2014) (referencing
“the sometimes stifling methods of treaty-drafting”); Jeffrey S. Peake, The Decline of Treaties? Obama, Trump, and the Politics of International Agreements
7 (Apr. 6, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3153840
[https://perma.cc/9MFX-449R] (explaining that “[t]he modern treaty process is
both procedurally and politically cumbersome, especially given the super-majority requirement for Senate approval”).
47. Frequently Asked Questions – UNCITRAL Texts, UNITED NATIONS
COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, https://uncitral.un.org/en/about/faq/texts#model
[https://perma.cc/YMN3-HPE5] (“A model law is created as a suggested pattern
for law-makers in national governments to consider adopting as part of their
domestic legislation.”).
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law should, ideally, enact the same legislative text; for that reason, model laws are sometimes called uniform laws.48 Whereas
treaties are binding upon contracting states and may only be
modified or denounced by a treaty amendment, model laws may
be amended or denounced unilaterally by a nation without violating international law.49 By promoting open communication,
the less formal process of developing and enacting a model law
can sometimes be more productive than a treaty approach.50
A model-law approach, however, has its own difficulties.
Model laws “are often subject to the same political pressures of
harmonization and the same need to conform to specific legal
traditions as a treaty or a convention.”51 Governments are also
reluctant to pioneer law reform.52 For example, CIGI, joined by
other influential organizations,53 has been attempting to persuade governments to enact the Model Law as a model law.54 So
far, those efforts have been unsuccessful.
48. The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration
exemplifies in an international context, and the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC) in the United States exemplifies in a subnational context, model laws
that have been uniformly enacted.
49. Giorgio Gaja et al., Instruments for Legal Integration in the European
Community, in 1 INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW: EUROPE AND THE AMERICAN
FEDERAL EXPERIENCE, BOOK 2, at 113, 153–54 (Mauro Cappelletti et al. eds.,
1985) (discussing the preference of European countries for conventions as opposed to model laws).
50. See id. at 154; Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Creating International Insolvency Law, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 563, 570–71 (1996) (noting that a treaty is
harder to implement than a model law).
51. Henry Deeb Gabriel, The Advantages of Soft Law in International Commercial Law: The Role of UNIDROIT, UNCITRAL, and the Hague Conference,
34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 655, 666 (2009).
52. See, e.g., Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, G-24 Discussion Paper Series, The
Politics of Legal Reform, at 27, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/GDS/MDPB/G24/17 (2002),
https://g24.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/17.pdf [https://perma.cc/RH8P
-SG3V] (observing that “the politics of legal reform are difficult” even when the
legal reform is desired).
53. These other organizations include the Jubilee USA Network, a prominent faith-based NGO. See Financial Crisis 10 Years On. Has the Response to
2008 Laid the Foundations for the Next?, BRETTON WOODS PROJECT, https://
www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2018/04/financial-crisis-10-years-response-2008
-laid-foundations-next/ [https://perma.cc/CY4U-3T36].
54. See, e.g., MAZIAR PEIHANI & KIM JENSEN, CTR. FOR INT’L GOVERNANCE
INNOVATION, THE MODEL LAW APPROACH: HOW ONTARIO COULD LEAD THE
WORLD IN PROVIDING CERTAINTY AND FAIRNESS IN SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING 1 (2017), https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/documents/
2017%20SDR%20Round%20Table%20Report%20WEB.pdf [https://perma.cc/
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Not needing governmental validation or consent, soft law
can provide rules of conduct when treaty-making and model laws
fail.55 The adoption of soft law also can help incrementally to develop norms, which governments may later try to codify into
hard law.56 Until that codification, however, soft-law rules are
unenforceable and thus second-best to hard law. Nonetheless,
the ability of parties contractually to choose soft law as governing law, as this Article proposes, would make that soft law directly enforceable against those parties.
II. SHOULD SOFT-LAW CHOICE OF LAW BE
ENFORCEABLE?
This analysis starts by examining the fundamental underpinnings of choice of law, which focus on party autonomy.57 It
then scrutinizes party autonomy to choose soft law under the
lens of freedom of contracting.58 Finally, it asks whether governmental interest in ensuring legitimate enforcement might limit
autonomy to choose soft law.59

KV5A-SD5Z] (discussing CIGI’s efforts to educate policy leaders and government officials about the advantages of the model-law structure); SCHWARCZ, supra note 14, at 2–5 (educating policymakers and other interested parties on the
impact of the Model Law and arguing for its enactment). Recall that the Model
Law would be regarded as an international model law from the perspective of
governments enacting it but soft law from the perspective of other governments.
See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
55. See Shelton, supra note 46, at 75–76.
56. Cf. Susan Block-Lieb & Terence C. Halliday, Incrementalisms in Global
Lawmaking, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 851, 852 (2007) (discussing the benefits of
incrementalism for global insolvency law reform); Gabriel, supra note 51, at 656
(observing that because soft law is not binding, its “likely effect is more to set
norms instead of hard and fast rules, but this still achieves the salutary goal of
creating broad international standards”); Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power
and Principle: An Integrated Theory of International Law, 72 U. CHI. L. REV.
469, 531 (2005) (“[S]tates can be gradually led toward stronger legal rules . . . by
starting with relatively weak international rules backed by little or no sanctions
that all states feel comfortable joining, but then gradually pushing states to accept successively stronger and more challenging requirements.”); John A.E. Pottow, Procedural Incrementalism: A Model for International Bankruptcy, 45 VA.
J. INT’L L. 935, 939 (2005) (observing that UNCITRAL’s Model Law on CrossBorder Insolvency “created an opportunity to bridge the theoretical gap between
universalists and territorialists . . . thus allow[ing] hesitant states to ‘acclimate’
to a regime of universalism”).
57. See infra Part II.A.
58. See infra Part II.B.
59. See infra Part II.C.
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A. PARTY AUTONOMY
Any analysis of whether soft-law choice of law should be enforceable should start with the fundamental underpinnings of
choice of law. Choice of law traces back to the Roman Empire,
where Roman citizens, in deciding what law applied to their
agreements, had the right to choose between Roman law and a
provincial or barbarous law.60 This principle of autonomy of the
will became known as the doctrine of party autonomy.61
Party autonomy became the prevailing doctrine in Europe
for private international law.62 The doctrine later became part of
English law after the great eighteenth century jurist Lord Mansfield cited it with approval.63 Mansfield argued that courts
should respect the right of parties to choose a state’s internal law
as the law governing their contract, rather than applying the law
of the state where the contract is to be performed (lex loci contractus) or the law of the forum state (lex fori).64 Courts in the
United States subsequently followed Lord Mansfield, making
party autonomy the dominant common law rule.65
Attempts by drafters of the First Restatement of Conflict of
Laws to reject party autonomy were seen as “inconsistent with
the predominant practice of courts” and deemed untenable,66
and thus were generally disregarded by courts.67 The current Restatement, in contrast, embraces party autonomy,68 which is
“sometimes viewed as an unqualified good.”69 Conceptually,
party autonomy is consistent with parties contracting for their
rights and obligations under private international law.70 Party
60. BEALE, supra note 32, at 1096.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1097 (observing that Lord Mansfield’s citation of that doctrine, in
Robinson v. Bland, was merely dicta).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1095, 1097.
66. ALEX MILLS, PARTY AUTONOMY IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 7
(2018).
67. See William J. Woodward, Jr., Contractual Choice of Law: Legislative
Choice in an Era of Party Autonomy, 54 SMU L. REV. 697, 712 (2001) (noting
that “[d]espite the First Restatement’s failure to recognize contractual choice of
law, courts enforced choice of law clauses”).
68. Id.; see also infra note 94 and accompanying text.
69. Michaels, supra note 7, at 46.
70. See id. (discussing party autonomy as “a professorial desire, emerging
from a long academic tradition particularly in Europe, to ‘privatize’ private law,
by removing its source from the state and making it independent”).
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autonomy is also pragmatic. It allows parties to choose the law
governing their contract, thereby increasing predictability and
certainty. It also reduces the burden on courts to choose the governing law when resolving multi-state disputes.71 Accordingly,
both common law countries and civil law countries now respect
party autonomy—insofar as it upholds the right of contracting
parties to choose a state’s internal law as the governing law.72
Logically, the principles of party autonomy—that the parties should be able to specify their respective rights and obligations73—should also justify the right of contracting parties to
choose soft law to govern those rights and obligations.74 Certain
pragmatic considerations that justify party autonomy—increasing predictability and certainty, and reducing the burden on
courts—likewise should justify choosing soft law.75 Honoring
“freely negotiated choice-of-law clauses in order to secure the
conditions necessary for the functioning of international commerce . . . benefits [states] even if at times their law is not applied.”76 The Restatement of Conflict of Laws supports these
considerations:
Prime objectives of contract law are to protect the justified expectations of the parties and to make it possible for them to foretell with
accuracy what will be their rights and liabilities under the contract.
These objectives may best be attained in multistate transactions by letting the parties choose the law to govern the validity of the contract
and the rights created thereby. In this way, certainty and predictability
of result are most likely to be secured.77

71. Willis L.M. Reese, Power of Parties to Choose Law Governing Their Contract, 54 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 49, 51 (1960).
72. Id.; cf. MILLS, supra note 66, at 3 (observing that party autonomy’s
longstanding history alone has made the doctrine justifiable and nearly
uncontested).
73. Cf. BEALE, supra note 32, at 1096 (arguing that, “in the case of all voluntary obligations, parties, since they have the right to choose whether or not
they will be bound, have also the right to choose the law under which they shall
be bound”); supra notes 69–70 and accompanying text (explaining why party
autonomy is conceptually consistent with private international law).
74. See Symeonides, supra note 27, at 895 (suggesting that party autonomy
should justify the right of contracting parties to choose soft law as their
governing law).
75. See Reese, supra note 71 and accompanying text.
76. Matthias Lehmann, Liberating the Individual from Battles Between
States: Justifying Party Autonomy in Conflict of Laws, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L
L. 381, 394 (2008).
77. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187.2 cmt. e (AM. LAW
INST. 1977).
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The only practical concern with allowing parties to choose
soft law is whether that “law” can be “found” with clarity.78 In
contrast to soft law, state law usually is “published and may
serve as precedent.”79 As a policy matter, giving parties the right
to choose soft law as governing law would be counterproductive
if that leads to effort or unpredictability that overburdens the
courts.80 The arbitration precedents address this concern, however, recognizing that soft law, especially if codified, often can be
found with clarity.81 Even when drawing from uncodified bodies
of soft law, arbitrators have been able to use “reason and logic”
to interpret the rules from the business context and common values shared by the business community.82 Soft law that is clear
and accessible therefore ought to satisfy this concern.83
From the perspective of party autonomy, therefore, the same
considerations that justify choosing a state’s internal law should

78. Cf. Gama, Jr. & Saumier, supra note 11, at 51–52 (arguing that allowing for the choice of non-state law would “promote[ ] the stability of the parties’
expectations under their contract, even though non-State law is arguably more
difficult to ascertain and may provide less valuable information than the lex fori
in terms of future legal treatment”).
79. Michaels, supra note 7, at 47 (observing the need for doctrinal
accuracy).
80. See Reese, supra note 71, at 51 (discussing the policy goal of reducing
the burden on courts). It could be burdensome, for example, if parties choose
soft law written in a language different than that of the contract.
81. Gabrielle Kauffman-Kohler, Soft Law in International Arbitration:
Codification and Normativity, 1 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 283, 295–98 (2010);
see Abul F.M. Maniruzzaman, The Lex Mercatoria and International Contracts:
A Challenge for International Commercial Arbitration?, 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV.
657, 711 (1999) (observing that arbitrators have little difficulty in applying softlaw rules or principles when they are definitive).
82. Maniruzzaman, supra note 81, at 713–14.
83. In some cases, soft law may even provide rules of conduct that provide
more clarity than hard law. In the context of international investment arbitration, for example, Professor Alvarez observes that “investment tribunals regularly cite to soft law” because the “rudimentary nature of international investment law . . . drives all [ ] stakeholders to anything that might fill the
interpretative gaps.” Alvarez, supra note 10, at 17; cf. Anna Gelpern, The Importance of Being Standard, in ESCB LEGAL CONFERENCE 2016, at 23 (2017),
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/escblegalconference2016_201702.en
.pdf [https://perma.cc/9XN8-TYT4] (arguing for adopting a more centralized,
modular approach to contracting incorporating by reference soft law that sets
forth widely-used non-financial terms). Nonetheless, Alvarez worries that reliance on soft law can “run[ ] contrary to the need states and investors have for
textually clear rules laid out in advance.” Alvarez, supra note 10, at 60.
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justify choosing soft law that is clear and accessible. Conceptually, however, party autonomy is related to, if not a subset of,
freedom of contracting.84 To ensure a complete analysis, this Article next examines how freedom of contracting might influence
the right to choose soft law as governing law.
B. FREEDOM OF CONTRACTING
Scholars traditionally have distinguished freedom of contracting and party autonomy.85 The distinction, however, is subtle; freedom of contracting is limited by mandatory rules of local
law,86 whereas party autonomy is limited by private international law, which respects overriding mandatory rules of local
law.87 The latter has been defined, with some circularity, as rules
that “are deemed so important that they should be applied to a
(cross-border) case by a court, even if the issue is, in principle,
governed by another law according to the choice of law rules of
the forum.”88
For example, freedom of contracting would not allow parties
to contract around mandatory local law that protects parties who
are infants.89 In contrast, party autonomy would allow parties to
choose a governing law that does not protect infants, subject to
a court limiting that choice under private international law by
84. See infra notes 85–87 and accompanying text (explaining why the distinction between party autonomy and freedom of contracting is subtle); infra
notes 94–95 and accompanying text (discussing the close relationship between
party autonomy and freedom of contracting).
85. MILLS, supra note 66, at 21–23; see E-mail from Ralf Michaels, Arthur
Larson Professor of Law, Duke Law Sch., to author (Oct. 19, 2018) (on file with
author) (stating that he does “not think freedom to choose the applicable law is
a part of freedom of contract” and that “[w]e distinguish normally in conflict of
laws”). Recall that party autonomy refers to the right of parties to choose the
governing law in private international law. See supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text.
86. In this Article, “local law” means the applicable national law absent a
choice of law. See Local Law, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2020)
(defining “local law” as including “the laws and legal principles and rules of a
state other than those concerned with conflict[ ] of law[s]”).
87. MILLS, supra note 66, at 21; cf. UGLJESA GRUSIC ET AL., CHESHIRE,
NORTH & FAWCETT: PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 743–51 (Paul Torremans &
James J. Fawcett eds., 15th ed. 2017) (discussing overriding mandatory rules of
local law, and observing that such rules create an “exception to the normal
choice of law rules”).
88. LOUWRENS R. KIESTRA, THE IMPACT OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION
ON HUMAN RIGHTS ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 24 (2014).
89. MILLS, supra note 66, at 348.
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finding that the mandatory local law protecting infants is an
overriding mandatory local law.90 What constitutes overriding
mandatory local law under private international law might also
depend on agreements among the relevant nations, some of
which include not only mandatory local law of the forum but also
mandatory local law having a connection to the contract.91 Subject to this subtle distinction,92 party autonomy functionally
should follow freedom of contracting.93
The Restatement of Conflict of Laws similarly views party
autonomy as consistent with, if not part of, freedom of contracting. It comments that “letting the parties choose the law to govern the validity of the contract and the rights created thereby
[is] . . . consistent with the fact that . . . persons are free within
broad limits to determine the nature of their contractual obligations.”94 Likewise, Professor Reese, the Restatement’s Chief Reporter, concludes that “[d]oubt as to the parties’ ability to choose
the governing law arises only with respect to questions that lie
beyond their contractual power.”95
90. Id. at 478–79.
91. KIESTRA, supra note 88, at 24. Agreements among nations might provide, for example, that private international law should respect local law rules
on consumer protection, see Laura Maria van Bochove, Overriding Mandatory
Rules as a Vehicle for Weaker Party Protection in European Private International Law, 7 ERASMUS L. REV. 147, 149 n.18 (2014), or “safeguard[ ] public interests.” See, e.g., Naciye Yilmaz, Overriding Mandatory Rules in Private International Law, ERDEM & ERDEM L. (July 2015), http://www.erdem-erdem.av.tr/
publications/law-post/overriding-mandatory-rules-in-private-international
-law/ [https://perma.cc/VJQ3-DY99] (quoting Regulation No. 593/2008, supra
note 24, art. 9(1)).
92. The distinction thus effectively turns on the difference, if any, between
applicable mandatory rules of local law and overriding mandatory rules of local
law. Professor Mills comments that this distinction could be much more significant for a legal system that has “a relatively low level of freedom of contract,
invalidating many potential contractual terms.” Email from Alex Mills, supra
note 9. A choice of foreign law might then enable the contracting parties to validly include those terms. Id.
93. Cf. MARIA HOOK, THE CHOICE OF LAW CONTRACT 12, 26 (2016) (calling
for a perspective that views choice of law and contract law as a fused “choice of
law contract,” and arguing that agreement to choice of law is itself a contract
and that party autonomy in contracting is determinative in the choice-of-law
process); Lehmann, supra note 76, at 390 (arguing that freedom of contracting
might be an expansive, universal principle of law into which contractual choice
of law should fall).
94. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2) cmt. e (AM.
LAW INST. 1971).
95. Reese, supra note 71, at 51.
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Freedom of contracting is generally subject to three limitations: paternalism, externalities, and public policy.96 Paternalism should not apply in this Article’s context of business contracting, assuming (as normally would be the case) that the
parties are sophisticated.97 It certainly should not apply to choosing the Model Law as the governing law of sovereign debt contracts; such contracts normally involve a sovereign debtor state
and sophisticated investors who are represented by counsel.98
However, the limitations imposed by externalities and public policy could apply to business contracting. First, consider externalities. Not all externalities defeat contract enforcement. To
the contrary, many contracts create externalities, yet they are
enforced.99 When examining externalities, the critical questions
are which externalities should defeat contract enforcement and
under what circumstances.100 Unfortunately, “[d]etermining
which of these [externality] impacts, if negative, are to count in
constraining the ability of parties to contract with each other
poses major conceptual problems.”101

96. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking Freedom of Contract: A Bankruptcy
Paradigm, 77 TEX. L. REV. 515, 535–39 (1999).
97. Cf. HAGUE PRINCIPLES, supra note 11, art. 1(1) at 17 (providing that the
Hague Principles apply to contracts “where each party is acting in the exercise
of its trade or profession” but “do not apply to consumer or employment contracts”); Symeon C. Symeonides, Contracts Subject to Non-State Norms, 54 AM.
J. COMP. L. 209, 224 (2006) (observing that “it is highly preferable to not allow
choice of non-state norms in consumer . . . and other contracts in which one
party is likely to be in a weak bargaining position”).
98. Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts:
An Empirical Examination of Sovereign Bonds, 53 EMORY L.J. 929, 930 (2004)
(“Sovereign bond contracts are a special breed of contract. The parties involved
are among the most sophisticated in the world financial markets . . . .”); cf.
Woodward, Jr., supra note 67, at 713 (“Comparable latitude is given to the parties’ ability to choose the law that will govern the transaction in the sophisticated areas of investment securities and letters of credit. Similarly, four commercial states have mandated that their courts uphold contractual choice of
‘unrelated’ law in large contracts.”). But cf. William J. Woodward, Jr., Finding
the Contract in Contracts for Law, Forum and Arbitration, 2 HASTINGS BUS.
L.J. 1, 42 (2006) (arguing that the doctrine of unconscionability, which derives
from paternalism in contract law, could be applied to unfair choice-of-law
clauses).
99. Schwarcz, supra note 96, at 551–52.
100. Id. at 552.
101. MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 20
(1993).
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Because this Article focuses on business contracting, it need
not attempt to solve those major conceptual problems. If all contracting parties agree to a soft-law choice of law, there are, by
definition, no externalities to those parties. Although that agreement might impose externalities on other parties, this Article
later shows that business contracts are unlikely to cause significant third-party externalities.102 Insignificant externalities certainly should not limit freedom of contracting.
Public policy also could limit freedom of contract and hence
party autonomy.103 Although most legal rules are regarded as
“default” rules that parties should be able to contract around,
some rules are so essential to the legal scheme that they are regarded as mandatory. Local law prohibits parties from contracting around mandatory rules.104 As later discussed, however, parties to business contracts are unlikely to want to disobey such
mandatory rules.105
In most cases, therefore, the principles of party autonomy
and freedom of contracting should respect the right of sophisticated parties to choose soft law as the governing law of their
business contracts. The discussion next explains, however, why
that right might be limited by the need for legitimacy.
C. LEGITIMACY
Recall that the limited non-arbitration precedents for choosing soft law as governing law apply to soft law in only three
cases: if the soft law either is promulgated by a leading intergovernmental authority, generally accepted (as neutral and balanced), or a trade code.106 These precedents implicitly recognize
102. See infra Part IV.
103. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
104. Schwarcz, supra note 96, at 529 n.69; cf. supra notes 86–91 and accompanying text (comparing mandatory rules of local law and overriding mandatory
rules of local law).
105. See infra notes 179–81 and accompanying text (discussing the reputational and other costs of disobeying mandatory rules). Some authors distinguish
mandatory rules and public policy. See, e.g., Symeonides, supra note 97, at 224;
Michal Wojewoda, Mandatory Rules in Private International Law, 7 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 183, 193 (2000) (observing that when overriding
mandatory local law does not apply, a court may still override choice of law when
it affronts the ordre public of the forum). That distinction, however, is not meaningful for this Article. Cf. HAGUE PRINCIPLES, supra note 11, cmt. ¶ 11.11 (describing overriding mandatory rules and public policy as sharing “the same doctrinal basis and, in effect, [being] two sides of the same coin”).
106. See supra notes 21–29 and accompanying text.
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that states will only enforce what they deem to be legitimate.107
If parties want a state to enforce their choice of soft law as governing law, they effectively must persuade state authorities to
trust “the legitimacy” of enforcing that choice.108
In the Western world, legitimacy is largely founded on trust
in institutional arrangements.109 Each of the aforesaid precedents—promulgation by a leading intergovernmental authority,
general acceptance, or being a trade code—derives its legitimacy
from institutional trust. The Article next examines these precedents and considers other possible ways of achieving legitimacy.
1. Promulgation by a Leading Intergovernmental Authority.
Certain intergovernmental organizations, such as the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT)110 and the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (UNCITRAL),111 are highly respected worldwide.
Their endorsement of a body of soft law would almost automatically impart it with a high degree of reputational legitimacy.112
107. Cf. Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA.
L. REV. 311, 502 (2002) (recognizing that enforcement of a judgment rendered
by a non-state community “is limited by the willingness of others to accept the
judgment as normatively legitimate”). The possibility that enforcement could
avoid certain mandatory rules of local law could enhance the need for legitimacy. See supra notes 90–91 and accompanying text.
108. Berman, supra note 107, at 325, 511, 532.
109. Fritz W. Scharpf, Problem-Solving Effectiveness and Democratic Accountability in the EU 1–2 (Max Planck Inst. for the Study of Soc’ys, Cologne,
Working Paper No. 03/1, 2003); cf. Hans Gribnau, Soft Law and Taxation: EU
and International Aspects, 2 LEGISPRUDENCE 67, 116 (2008) (arguing that the
legitimacy of E.U. tax soft-law instruments can be enhanced through increased
transparency, achieved by public participation, and the consultation of stakeholders); Jonathan Weinberg, ICANN and the Problem of Legitimacy, 50 DUKE
L.J. 187, 213, 257–58 (2000) (discussing how the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), the public-private organization overseeing parts of the internet, has attempted to enhance its legitimacy by gaining the
consensus of the international Internet community).
110. UNIDROIT was originally founded in 1926 as an auxiliary body of the
League of Nations. History and Overview, UNIDROIT, https://www.unidroit
.org/about-unidroit/overview [https://perma.cc/8UPD-4WFE].
111. UNCITRAL was created to modernize and harmonize rules on international business. Origin, Mandate and Composition of UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL,
https://uncitral.un.org/en/about/faq/mandate_composition [https://perma.cc/
8X4E-YRZ3].
112. Cf. SYMEONIDES, supra note 18, at 407 (arguing for the legitimacy of
soft-law “norms . . . drafted by intergovernmental bodies such as UNIDROIT
and UNCITRAL”).
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Even if less institutional, certain intergovernmental bodies
may merit respect by virtue of their creation, composition, or
work product. Professor Symeonides argues, for example, that
soft law drafted by an impartial intergovernmental body—such
as the Lando Commission, formed by the European Parliament
in 1982 to develop a European code for contract law—could have
legitimacy.113
Some, however, might judge legitimacy not by the reputation of the organization promulgating the soft law but by the
fairness of the soft law itself. Professor Alvarez, for example, argues that “soft law produced by more public and global institutions like the UN or the ILO does not necessarily enhance [its]
democratic legitimacy”114 because “[g]lobal processes within UN
system institutions . . . replicate the standards favored by Western governments to enhance their own interests.”115
2. General Acceptance.
Something that is generally accepted is, almost by definition, seen as legitimate. The UCP, for example, is easily the
world’s most generally accepted body of commercial soft law.116
Most nations respect the ability of parties to choose the UCP as
the law governing their international letters of credit,117 not-

113. Id. at 406–07.
114. Alvarez, supra note 10, at 62.
115. Id. (citing an example in which soft law high-quality labor standards
work “almost everywhere against developing countries”).
116. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
117. See, e.g., Alaska Textile Co. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 982 F.2d
813, 816 & n.1 (2d Cir. 1992) (noting that over 140 countries had adopted the
UCP and that the UCP governs most international letters of credit); Paolo S.
Grassi, Letter of Credit Transactions: The Banks’ Position in Determining Documentary Compliance. A Comparative Evaluation Under U.S., Swiss and German Law, 7 PACE INT’L L. REV. 81, 104–05, 104 n.62 (1995) (discussing the UCP
and its express and implied application to letters of credit); Charmian Wang
Corne, Rethinking the Law of Letters of Credit 38–85 (2003) (unpublished doctoral thesis) (on file with the University of Sydney), https://ses.library.usyd
.edu.au/bitstream/handle/2123/660/adt-NU20051027.16310703chapter2
.pdf?sequence=6&isAllowed=y [https://perma.cc/2G7L-3V7L] (summarizing the
development of the UCP and its general acceptance within the international
letter-of-credit community).
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withstanding that it is merely a set of rules published by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC),118 a private-sector organization.119 Relatively few bodies of soft law, however, appear
to be generally accepted. Also, except for cases where it is obvious,120 general acceptance is a somewhat ambiguous standard.121
Under political pressure, the requirement that generally accepted soft law also be neutral and balanced was added to the
Hague Principles.122 Whether that addition actually increases legitimacy is unclear; if anything, it might increase ambiguity.123
Professor Michaels argues, for example, that there is no clear
basis to assess whether any given body of soft law is neutral and
balanced.124 This Article’s normative framework will focus
simply on whether the soft law is generally accepted, without
that addition.
3. Trade Code.
The UCP gains legitimacy not only by being generally accepted. It also is a trade code: “an international body of trade
practice that is commonly adopted by international and domestic
letters of credit and as such is the ‘law of the transaction’ by
118. INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, I.C.C. PUB. NO. 600, UNIFORM CUSTOMS
AND PRACTICE FOR DOCUMENTARY CREDITS (2007).
119. See History, INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, https://iccwbo.org/about-us/
who-we-are/history/ [https://perma.cc/7AJH-7N7Y] (describing the ICC as a private-sector organization that strives to set global standards for business).
120. Besides the UCP, the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights is
another obvious case. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra
note 2.
121. MILLS, supra note 66, at 505 (arguing that what general “[a]cceptance
on an ‘international, supranational or regional level’ . . . means is opaque”);
Michaels, supra note 7, at 59 (arguing that, in most contexts, “generally accepted” is a “vague standard”). Professor Mills explains why that standard is
ambiguous:
It is unclear, for example, whether this [standard] requires acceptance
only by those subject to the non-state rules, or by society in general—
the former might not be enough to establish that the rules are generally
considered legitimate, but the latter might be too difficult to satisfy.
Islamic law, for example, is certainly accepted by Muslims (albeit subject to different interpretations), but its application is broadly rejected
in most Western states—it is unclear whether it would satisfy this test.
MILLS, supra note 66, at 505.
122. See infra notes 130–32 and accompanying text.
123. See MILLS, supra note 66, at 506 (explaining why the neutral-and-balanced “criterion is . . . likely to present difficulties in application”).
124. Michaels, supra note 7, at 57–68.
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agreement of the parties.”125 Relatively few bodies of soft law,
however, represent trade codes or are likely to be redacted into
trade codes in the foreseeable future.126
4. Other Possible Ways To Achieve Legitimacy.
Another way for soft law to achieve legitimacy is for national
law to explicitly authorize its application. In the United States,
for example, the UCC authorizes parties to make their letters of
credit subject to the UCP: “the liability of an issuer [of a letter of
credit] is governed by any rules of custom or practice, such as the
[UCP], to which the letter of credit . . . is expressly made subject.”127 If a nation explicitly were to authorize parties to choose
a particular body of soft law as their sovereign debt contract’s
governing law, that choice would be enforceable—at least in that
nation’s courts. Explicit authorization of soft law, however, is
unusual.
Arguably,128 soft law might also achieve legitimacy by being
fair.129 Under the Hague Principles, for example, the European
Union feared that allowing parties to choose generally accepted
soft law—the originally proposed standard—still could give rise
to “the proliferation of unfair unilateral rules.”130 To address potential unfairness, the EU required that such soft law also be

125. U.C.C. § 5-101 cmt. (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
126. Professor Alvarez suggests an area where soft law might become redacted into a trade code: “developments with respect to digital data where hard
law is severely lagging behind real world commercial/technical developments.”
E-mail from José Enrique Alvarez, Herbert & Rose Rubin Professor of Int’l Law,
N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, to author (Dec. 17, 2018) (on file with author).
127. U.C.C. § 5-116(c).
128. Jurisprudentially, fairness signals legitimacy. See THOMAS M. FRANCK,
FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 25–46 (1995). Some nonetheless might argue that fairness is a necessary but insufficient condition for
legitimacy.
129. See supra notes 114–15 and accompanying text (arguing that the legitimacy of soft law should be judged by its fairness, not by the reputation of the
organization promulgating it). Efficacy might also arguably be viewed as a basis
of legitimacy of soft law. See Janet Koven Levit, Bottom-Up Lawmaking
Through a Pluralist Lens: The ICC Banking Commission and the Transnational
Regulation of Letters of Credit, 57 EMORY L.J. 1147, 1155 & n.10 (2008) (arguing
that the efficacy of soft law can be a basis for it to harden into hard law).
130. Saumier, supra note 46, at 12–13.
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“neutral and balanced.”131 As observed, however, it is unclear
how to determine that.132
Indeed, absent a body of soft law being manifestly fair,133 it
is unclear how to determine its substantive fairness. The inability to assess substantive fairness may well force the legitimacy
analysis back to one of institutional trust134—effectively a test of
procedural fairness. Professor Michaels thus argues that fairness “must be understood in a formal, not a substantive way,”
permitting soft law to “be chosen only when it has been formulated by an agency that is, with regard to the parties, neutral.”135
That test could be met, he contends, if “an agency could claim to
represent either all parties (like the ICC with regard to commercial actors) or none (like UNIDROIT).”136
Because private organizations can promulgate soft law,137
procedural fairness should not be limited to trust in intergovernmental organizations.138 It should also extend to the private sector, reflecting an evolution from the “assumption that state representatives most legitimately represent the people” to
recognition that “[i]n an increasingly complex society . . . authority flows from other sources too, both public and private, in particular, expertise, knowledge, or acceptance by affected stakeholders.”139 Professor Michaels implicitly recognizes this by
using the example of the ICC, a private-sector organization,140
131. As discussed, Article 3 of the Hague Principles now includes this neutral-and-balanced requirement. See supra notes 29, 122 and accompanying text;
see also Michaels, supra note 7, at 55.
132. See supra notes 123–25 and accompanying text.
133. This would require the soft law to be very obviously and clearly perceived as fair. See Manifestly, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, https://dictionary
.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/manifestly [https://perma.cc/8457-N77C] (defining “manifestly” as “very obviously”). In this sense, manifest fairness, like
pornography, may be characterized by an “I know it when I see it” test. See
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
134. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
135. Michaels, supra note 7, at 58.
136. Id. at 59 (describing this as “a relative concept of neutrality: Islamic law
becomes neutral and balanced as between Muslims but loses that character as
between a Muslim and a non-Muslim”).
137. See supra note 119 and accompanying text (discussing soft law promulgated by the ICC).
138. Cf. supra note 114 and accompanying text (explaining why soft law produced by intergovernmental organizations might not even enhance democratic
legitimacy).
139. Pauwelyn et al., supra note 9, at 742.
140. See supra notes 118–19 and accompanying text.
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as meriting institutional trust.141 Professor Symeonides likewise
observes that soft law drafted by an impartial academic organization could have legitimacy.142 A fairness test for legitimacy logically should turn, therefore, on the neutrality of the body promulgating the soft law, whether or not that body is
governmental.143
Arbitration precedents might also inform the question of legitimacy.144 Parties to arbitration “have always had the power to
authorize the arbitral tribunal to decide their dispute ex aequo
et bono, that is, according to what is just and fair, without reference to any state law.”145 Therefore, Professor Symeonides argues, “[a] fortiori, [those] parties have the power to authorize the
[arbitral] tribunal to decide according to a designated set of nonstate norms.”146 These considerations, however, largely parallel
the prior discussion of legitimacy. The “just and fair” condition
would appear to be subject to the same lack of clarity about how
a body of soft law should be assessed to be fair, possibly forcing
the legitimacy analysis back to one of institutional trust.147 The
“nonstate norms” condition suggests the body of soft law should

141. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
142. SYMEONIDES, supra note 18, at 406–07 (noting also that soft law proposed by a partisan private organization would, in contrast, lack legitimacy).
143. This Article does not adopt a more aggressive view of fairness suggested
by Michaels and Symeonides; rather, it presumes fairness if the contracting
parties are sophisticated. Symeonides observes, for example, that “[o]nce the
weak parties are segregated and protected, then one can allow the contractual
choice of non-state norms in all other contracts . . . .” Symeonides, supra note
97, at 226. Similarly, Michaels observes that “it is not clear at all why the parties, whose autonomy is otherwise emphasized, must be restricted to the choice
of a balanced law at all.” Michaels, supra note 7, at 58. Under that presumption,
soft law chosen by sophisticated parties to business contracts would always be
deemed fair. See supra note 97 and accompanying text (restricting this Article’s
analysis to sophisticated parties to business contracts).
144. Recall that significant precedent supports choosing soft law as governing law for purposes of arbitration. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
145. SYMEONIDES, supra note 18, at 409.
146. Id. Professor Symeonides elsewhere suggests that allowing non-statelaw choice of law in arbitration “can be defended [in the abstract] on grounds of
contractual intent . . . since an arbitration agreement reflects the parties’ explicit intent to go outside the state judicial system . . . .” Symeonides, supra note
97, at 225.
147. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
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be accepted as a norm, which implies it should have at least some
general acceptance.148
The possibility, however, that arbitration might require less
of a practical showing of legitimacy for choosing soft law raises
an interesting “bootstrap” question: should the fact that a body
of soft law provides that all disputes thereunder be resolved
through arbitration justify choosing that soft law as governing
law? The Model Law itself provides, for example, that “[a]ll disputes arising [thereunder] shall be resolved by binding arbitration before a panel of three arbitrators.”149
The answer would appear to be no. The arbitration exception applies to the rules by which arbitrators actually adjudicate
a dispute.150 The exception does not appear to apply to choosing
the substantive rules that govern the rights and obligations of
contract parties in the first place.151 The mere fact that a contract contemplates arbitration of disputes should not be a basis
for altering the underlying rights and obligations of the parties.152 Altering rights on that basis could cause confusion; for

148. Cf. Symeon C. Symeonides, Contracts Subject to Non-State Norms, AM.
J. COMP. L. 209, 211 (2006) (arguing that “what makes the [arbitration agreement’s selecting of] nonstate norms binding is not the parties’ volition alone, but
rather the willingness of a state to enforce a contract that incorporates these
norms”).
149. SCHWARCZ, supra note 14, app., ch. V, art. 10, § 1.
150. See SYMEONIDES, supra note 18, at 487 (explaining that parties have
wide power to choose the law to be applied by the arbitral tribunal). The Model
Law itself provides that flexibility:
The arbitration shall be governed by [generally accepted international
arbitration rules of (name of neutral international arbitration body)]
[the rules of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes/ International Centre for Dispute Resolution/ International
Chamber of Commerce International Court of Arbitration/ specify
other international arbitration organization]. Notwithstanding Article
10(2), if all the parties to an arbitration contractually agree that such
arbitration shall be governed by other rules, it shall be so governed.
SCHWARCZ, supra note 14, app., ch. V, art. 10, §§ 2–3.
151. An arbitration agreement or clause pointing to a specific governing law
(e.g., the Model Law) does not necessarily determine the law that will govern
the contract outside of the arbitration process. For example, the doctrine of separability, observed in the United States as well as in many transnational and
foreign arbitration regimes, holds that the law governing an arbitration agreement or clause can be separate from the law governing the main contract.
SYMEONIDES, supra note 18, at 473.
152. But see Christopher R. Leslie, The Arbitration Bootstrap, 94 TEX. L.
REV. 265, 266 (2015) (finding that firms have committed arbitration bootstrap-

2496

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[104:2471

example, if an arbitration provision is not upheld and the dispute
goes to a court, the parties’ rights and obligations could be retroactively changed.153
Ironically, the potential for arbitration itself to cause that
confusion militates in favor of courts respecting a choice of soft
law as governing law. Although arbitral tribunals respect a
choice of non-state law,154 a court that finds an arbitration agreement invalid and hears the same dispute on the merits rarely
would give effect to that choice of law—thereby altering the parties’ rights.155 If courts respected a choice of soft law, however,
those rights would not become altered (thereby avoiding
confusion).156
5. Proposing a Choice-of-Law Framework.
Synthesizing the foregoing analysis, sophisticated parties to
business contracts should have the right to choose soft law as
governing law157 if (1) the choice of law does not create significant externalities (or the social benefits of that choice are likely
to exceed those externalities);158 (2) the soft law is clear and accessible;159 and (3) the soft law has legitimacy by virtue of being
either generally accepted,160 promulgated by a respected independent and unbiased organization, or manifestly fair.161
ping by including substantive contract terms having nothing to do with arbitration (e.g., statute of limitations and reduced damages) in arbitration clauses in
the hope that courts will enforce them based on the Supreme Court’s extreme
deference to arbitration clauses).
153. Cf. Saumier, supra note 46, at 19–21 (citations omitted) (observing that
if “parties have included [an arbitration] choice of law clause in their contract
designating [a body of soft law] to govern their contract, this choice would not
be effective if a dispute is brought before a State court. . . . What might justify
this inconsistency in the State’s own approach to choice-of-law in international
commercial contracts?”).
154. See supra notes 145–47 and accompanying text.
155. See E-mail from Alex Mills, supra note 9; supra notes 145–47 and accompanying text.
156. E-mail from Alex Mills, supra note 9.
157. This right to choose soft law as governing law includes, of course, the
right to choose soft law as all or part of the governing law. See supra note 30
and accompanying text.
158. These restrictions on externalities provide a safe harbor, not an absolute condition, because significant externalities do not always limit freedom of
contracting. See supra notes 101–02 and accompanying text.
159. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
160. Supra Part II.C.2.
161. Legitimacy also should require the soft law not to be manifestly unfair.
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III. SHOULD SOFT-LAW INCORPORATION BY
REFERENCE BE ENFORCEABLE?
As an alternative analytical framework, next consider incorporating soft law by reference into a contract. Technically, incorporation by reference is not a choice-of-law rule.162 It is “merely
a shorthand way of drafting the contract, equivalent in legal effect to cutting and pasting the text of those rules [of soft law] into
the pages of the contract.”163
The analysis of whether soft-law incorporation by reference
should be enforceable first addresses autonomy and freedom of
contracting and then addresses legitimacy.
A. AUTONOMY AND FREEDOM OF CONTRACTING
Reflecting widespread contract-law precedent,164 the Restatement observes that parties may incorporate by reference extrinsic material.165 The Restatement goes further than most
such precedent, however, by including “provisions of . . . foreign
law” as an example of extrinsic material: “[P]arties, generally
speaking, have power to determine the terms of their contractual
engagements. They may spell out these terms in the contract. In

Assuming the contracting parties are sophisticated (so they do not take unfair
advantage of each other), the condition that the choice of soft law not create
significant externalities (or the social benefits of that choice are likely to exceed
those externalities) should assure there is no manifest unfairness. See supra
notes 128–31 and accompanying text.
162. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(1) cmt. c
(AM. LAW INST. 1971) (stating that incorporation by reference “is not a rule of
choice of law”).
163. MILLS, supra note 66, at 23.
164. Incorporation by reference traces back over a century. See Incorporation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 613 (2d ed. 1910) (defining “incorporation by
reference” within the definition of “incorporation”). Incorporation by reference
is also an integral concept in “traditional contracts.” Richard Raysman & Peter
Brown, Incorporation by Reference Provision in Related Agreement Allows for
Enforcement of Warranty Disclaimer in Subsequent Software License,
LAW.COM: N.Y. L.J. (May 7, 2018), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/
2018/05/07/incorporation-by-reference-provision-in-related-agreement-allows
-for-enforcement-of-warranty-disclaimer-in-subsequent-software-license/
[https://perma.cc/BJF2-AJCN].
165. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(1) cmt. c (articulating the principle justifying Subsection (1), which allows application of a chosen state law to govern the contractual rights and duties if “the particular issue
is one which the parties could have resolved by an explicit provision in their
agreement directed to that issue”).
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the alternative, they may incorporate into the contract by reference extrinsic material which may, among other things, be the
provisions of some foreign law.”166
If parties may incorporate by reference provisions of foreign
law, they also should have the right, by analogy, to incorporate
by reference soft law.167 Both represent rules of conduct that, absent such incorporation by reference, would be unenforceable.168
A more normative analysis also supports that view. Because
incorporation by reference is not a choice-of-law rule,169 the
party-autonomy jurisprudence should not apply.170 The freedomof-contracting jurisprudence should apply, however, because incorporation by reference is contractual.171 Logically, that freedom-of-contracting jurisprudence would apply to incorporating
soft law by reference the same way it applies to choosing soft law
as governing law.172 That, in turn, should lead to a similar conclusion: that the incorporation by reference of soft law into business contracts should be respected under contract theory.173
However, because the party-autonomy jurisprudence does
not apply,174 incorporating soft law by reference would not gain
166. Id. (emphasis added).
167. See Symeon C. Symeonides, The Scope and Limits of Party Autonomy
in International Contracts: A Comparative Analysis, in PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES AND CONTINUING RELEVANCE 101,
127 n.155 (Franco Ferrari & Diego Fernandez Arroyo eds., 2019) (arguing that
the extrinsic material referenced in that Restatement comment “can also be
a . . . collection of non-state norms”).
168. See Andre Sobczak, Are Codes of Conduct in Global Supply Chains Really Voluntary? From Soft Law Regulations of Labour Relations to Consumer
Law, 16 BUS. ETHICS Q. 167, 171 (2006) (“Corporate codes of conduct are usually
considered as ethical commitments without any legal effect. At best, they form
part of the category of soft law, and constitute norms without legally binding
effect . . . .”).
169. See supra note 162 and accompanying text (identifying the restatement
provision distinguishing choice-of-law doctrine from incorporation by reference).
170. Cf. supra notes 60–72 and accompanying text (discussing party autonomy as choice-of-law doctrine).
171. Robert Whitman, Incorporation by Reference in Commercial Contracts,
21 MD. L. REV. 1 (1961) (describing incorporation by reference as a device for
alleviating contractual complexity).
172. See supra notes 96–105 and accompanying text (detailing limitations
inherent in freedom-of-contracting jurisprudence).
173. See supra Part II.B (concluding that a soft-law choice of law should be
respected under freedom of contracting).
174. See supra notes 169–71 and accompanying text (referring to a Restatement provision distinguishing between party autonomy and incorporation by
reference).
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a possible advantage provided by that jurisprudence: the ability
of the chosen soft law to avoid the application of mandatory rules
imposed under local law.175 Professor Michaels explains the distinction:
This is an important difference. If a body of rules is merely incorporated, the whole contract (including the incorporated rules) remains
governed by a state’s law, including its mandatory rules. Where, by contrast, a body of rules is chosen in the sense of choice of law, that body
becomes the applicable contract law . . . .176

The Restatement also illustrates this difference. It would exclude, for example, an incorporation by reference of an unrelated
state’s law into a trust agreement in order to pay the trustee a
commission that would exceed the maximum permitted local-law
rate.177
In reality, this difference is likely to be insignificant for several reasons. Party autonomy is itself limited by private international law, which respects overriding mandatory rules of local
law.178 Also, for reputational and other reasons, parties to business contracts rarely would want, much less try, to disobey mandatory rules of local law.179 Most companies in fact make special
efforts to demonstrate that they are socially responsible.180 Furthermore, there is “not a large difference” between issues that
parties could resolve explicitly by contract (and thus could be resolved through incorporation by reference) and those that are
subject to mandatory rules.181
175. See supra notes 85–93 and accompanying text (discussing the capacity
of party-autonomy jurisprudence to override mandatory provisions of local law).
176. Michaels, supra note 7, at 44 (emphasis added).
177. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 cmt. c, illus.
4–5 (AM. LAW INST. 1971) (detailing a hypothetical wherein an attempt to incorporate an unrelated state’s law is excluded).
178. See supra note 87 and accompanying text (discussing the deference paid
by private international law to mandatory local law).
179. See, e.g., Kevin Jackson, Global Corporate Governance: Soft Law and
Reputational Accountability, 35 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 41, 85–87 (2010) (discussing
tenacious attacks on the reputation of global companies accused of trying to circumvent mandatory local laws, addressing such things as child labor, fair
wages, and workplace conditions).
180. Id. (discussing how companies have been affirmatively protecting their
reputations by voluntarily taking steps to demonstrate accountability and corporate social responsibility). Technology has greatly increased the public dissemination of information, undermining a company’s ability to hide socially irresponsible action, even if it occurs in a distant part of the world, and reinforcing
“reputation [as] a valuable commodity.” Id. at 86.
181. Symeonides, supra note 97, at 223; cf. KIESTRA, supra note 88, at 24
(observing that “[m]andatory rules do not—as of yet—play an important role in
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B. LEGITIMACY
The Restatement of Conflict of Laws does not require a legitimacy standard for incorporating extrinsic material by reference.182 That makes sense: because incorporation by reference is
“merely a shorthand way of drafting the contract,”183 any material that could have been written directly into the contract
should be able to be incorporated into the contract by reference.184 Therefore, soft law that could be directly written into a
contract and made part of its terms should be able to be incorporated into that contract by reference.185
Legitimacy nonetheless should require that the incorporated-by-reference soft law be clear and accessible.186 That would
enable the soft law to be identified and found with clarity,187 and
also would reduce the burden on courts.188
the discussion concerning the impact of the [European Convention on Human
Rights] on private international law”).
182. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(1) cmt. c (detailing parameters of incorporation by reference by declining to impose a legitimacy standard).
183. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
184. This can become complicated where the incorporation by reference is
dynamic, automatically applying to the latest version of the incorporated material. Normally, incorporation by reference is retrospective, applying only to a
version of the incorporated material in existence at the time the contract is doing the incorporation by reference. For a detailed discussion of the difference,
see Daniel Schwarcz, Is U.S. Insurance Regulation Unconstitutional?, 25 CONN.
INS. L.J. 191 (2018) (showing how states delegate substantial powers to the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), a private body, by dynamically incorporating by reference NAIC materials).
185. This logic provides yet another reason why UCC § 1-302 should not be
limited to incorporation by reference. See supra note 20. If that section were so
limited, incorporation by reference under the UCC would be restricted to soft
law promulgated by leading intergovernmental authorities or to trade codes
such as the UCP. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
186. Because the choice-of-law analysis addressed this requirement in the
context of discussing party autonomy, it was already taken as a given when
discussing legitimacy. See supra notes 78–83 and accompanying text.
187. See David Owens, Can Outside Material Be Incorporated by Reference
into Local Development Regulations?, COATES’ CANONS: NC LOCAL GOV’T L.
(May 5, 2014), https://canons.sog.unc.edu/can-outside-material-be
-incorporated-by-reference-into-local-development-regulations/ [https://perma
.cc/K83M-2L3A] (observing that “many courts have stated a general rule allowing incorporation by reference if the document to be incorporated is sufficiently
identified and made a part of the public record”).
188. See supra note 80 and accompanying text (discussing how inaccessible
or unclear use of soft law would increase courts’ burden, thereby undermining
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C. PROPOSING AN INCORPORATION-BY-REFERENCE
(ALTERNATIVE) FRAMEWORK
Synthesizing the foregoing analysis, sophisticated parties to
business contracts should have the right to incorporate soft-law
rules into the contract by reference if (1) that incorporation by
reference does not create significant externalities (or the social
benefits of that incorporation by reference are likely to exceed
those externalities); and (2) those rules are clear and accessible.189 Although any rules so incorporated would be overridden
by applicable mandatory rules of local law, parties to business
contracts rarely would want to disobey such mandatory rules.190
It sometimes might be ambiguous whether a contract is purporting to choose soft law as governing law or to incorporate that
soft law by reference.191 Language stating that a contract is “governed by” or “subject to” particular soft law should evidence
choosing that soft law as governing law.192 In the event of doubt,
however, a court should make the final determination.193
Next, this Article applies these frameworks to the Model
Law, as an example of soft law.

the policy goal of judicial efficiency).
189. Supra note 102 and accompanying text (asserting insignificant externalities should not preclude clear and accessible incorporation by reference);
supra notes 78–83 and accompanying text (recognizing the need for accessibility
to avoid harming judicial economy).
190. See Arthur Nussbaum, Conflict Theories of Contracts: Cases Versus Restatement, 51 YALE L.J. 893, 908 (1942) (“There is some truth in the centuriesold doctrine that parties contracting in a given territory must not disobey prohibitions set up by the law of that territory.”).
191. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing the ambiguity of
whether certain quoted language constitutes a choice of soft law or merely an
incorporation of that soft law by reference).
192. HAGUE PRINCIPLES, supra note 11, cmt. ¶ 4.3 (asserting that the use of
the phrases “governed by” or “subject to” “meet the requirements of an express
choice”).
193. See Peter V. Pantaleo et al., Rethinking the Role of Recourse in the Sale
of Financial Assets, 52 BUS. LAW. 159, 164 (1996) (arguing that if there is doubt
whether a given transfer of financial assets constitutes a sale or a secured loan,
the court could make the final determination). In making that determination,
the court might also consider giving second-best respect to the parties’ intentions by re-characterizing a non-enforceable choice of soft law as an incorporation of that soft law by reference. See id. at 185–87 (arguing that if a court finds
that a given transfer of financial assets would be unenforceable as a sale, it
should re-characterize that transfer as (at least) a secured loan).

2502

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[104:2471

IV. APPLYING THE CHOICE-OF-LAW AND
INCORPORATION-BY-REFERENCE FRAMEWORKS
Section A below applies the choice-of-law framework to the
Model Law, as an example of soft law. Section B thereafter applies the incorporation-by-reference framework to the Model
Law. These applications illustrate why choosing soft law as governing law and incorporating soft law by reference can provide
flexible and practical alternatives to treaty-making.
A. CHOOSING THE MODEL LAW AS GOVERNING LAW
Under this Article’s framework, sophisticated parties to
business contracts should have the right to choose soft law as
governing law if (1) the choice of law does not create significant
externalities (or the social benefits of that choice are likely to
exceed those externalities); (2) the soft law is clear and accessible; and (3) the soft law has legitimacy by virtue of being either
generally accepted, promulgated by a respected independent and
unbiased organization, or manifestly fair. Using this framework,
this Part considers whether parties to sovereign debt contracts
should have the right to choose the Model Law as part of their
governing law.194
Parties to sovereign debt contracts are invariably sophisticated, consisting of institutional creditors and debtor-states.195
If those parties agree to choose the Model Law as part of their
governing law,196 by definition they would bear no externalities.197 Nor would there be externalities to subsequent holders of
the sovereign debt, who derive their rights from the original debt
contract and thus implicitly consent to its terms. Choosing the
Model Law as part of the governing law also would be unlikely
to impose externalities—much less, significant externalities—on

194. Most relevant to this analysis, the Model Law would allow a supermajority vote of creditors to change critical contract terms without necessarily getting every affected party’s consent. SCHWARCZ, supra note 14, app., ch. III,
art. 7(2).
195. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
196. To avoid law-change risk, any choice of law should lock in a specific
version, by date, of the Model Law.
197. Parties who disagree with that choice in order to try to preserve their
ability to act as rent-seeking holdouts could, technically, suffer externalities.
However, the law should not protect the ability to unreasonably extract value
from other parties in a debt restructuring. Schwarcz, supra note 45, at 374.
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others.198 Other creditors of the debtor-state would be unaffected
because the Model Law, by its terms, only affects the rights and
obligations of creditors that contractually consent to it.199 Empirical data on supermajority-voting collective action clauses
(CACs) also indicate that the most important provision of the
Model Law—its supermajority voting—would be unlikely to increase, and may even lower, overall sovereign-debt borrowing
costs.200
If anything, choosing the Model Law as part of the governing
law would produce benefits. Designed to help a debtor-state restructure its unsustainable debts,201 the Model Law would reduce the social costs of sovereign debt crises, the need for sovereign debt bailouts, and the risk of systemic contagion from a
debtor-state’s default.202 Furthermore, the Model Law would
help to solve the problem of inadvertent variation, identified by
Professor Gelpern. She argues that because “international policy
initiatives to prevent and manage financial crises rest on the assumption that sovereign debt contracts follow a generally accepted standard,” those initiatives “would make no sense in the

198. In general, soft-law choice of law would be unlikely to create significant
externalities in a business context, where transactions typically operate within
well-developed norms and customs. Those norms and customs may even contribute to developing mandatory rules of local law and private international law.
Absent the granting of collateral, for example, soft law would probably contravene those mandatory rules if it gave special payment priority to particular
creditors because “[t]he equality of creditors norm is widely viewed as the single
most important principle in American bankruptcy law.” David A. Skeel, Jr., The
Empty Idea of “Equality of Creditors,” 166 U. PA. L. REV. 699, 700 (2018).
199. SCHWARCZ, supra note 14, app., ch. I, art. 1(1). (“This Law applies
where, by contract or otherwise, (a) the law of [this jurisdiction] governs . . . the
debtor-creditor relationship between a State and its creditors . . . .”).
200. See Michael Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Collective Action Clauses for the
Eurozone, 18 REV. FIN. 2045, 2045 (2014) (finding that the inclusion of supermajority-voting CACs in sovereign debt contracts actually leads to a lower cost
of capital); cf. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ ET AL., CTR. FOR INT’L GOVERNANCE INNOVATION, FRAMEWORKS FOR SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING 1 (2014) (arguing
that uncertainty due to the absence of an effective debt-resolution framework
“increases the costs of borrowing” for sovereigns).
201. See supra note 14 and accompanying text; see also SCHWARCZ, supra
note 14, app., pmbl. (“The Purpose of this Law is to provide effective mechanisms for restructuring unsustainable sovereign debt so as to reduce (a) the social costs of sovereign debt crises, (b) systemic risk to the financial system, (c)
creditor uncertainty, and (d) the need for sovereign debt bailouts, which are
costly and create moral hazard.”).
202. Schwarcz, supra note 45, at 347–48.
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absence of standardisation.”203 She finds, however, that “sovereign bond contracts are not nearly as standardised as market
participants and policy makers seem to suggest.”204 This inadvertent variation “can make contracts internally inconsistent,
vulnerable to opportunistic lawsuits and errors of judicial interpretation. Variation could also make debt instruments less liquid, especially during periods of market stress.”205
To reduce variation, she advocates “a more centralised, modular approach to [sovereign debt] contracting, whereby a subset
of widely-used non-financial terms would be produced by an authoritative third party (a public, private, or public-private body)
and incorporated by reference in individual transactions.”206 The
ability to include the Model Law as governing law would help to
facilitate that modular approach.
The Model Law should also meet the standard of being clear
and accessible. It has been clearly codified.207 It also has been
fully vetted by many of the world’s leading experts in sovereign
debt restructuring.208 And it is publicly available on the Internet,
without charge.209
The Model Law additionally should meet the legitimacy
standard of being either generally accepted, promulgated by a
respected independent and unbiased organization, or manifestly
fair. It is promulgated by CIGI, a highly respected independent
and unbiased think tank.210 Also, its key provisions, which focus
on supermajority voting,211 reflect generally accepted aspirational best practices for sovereign debt restructuring. They parallel, for example, the supermajority-voting CACs212 proposed by
the International Capital Market Association (ICMA),213 which
203. Gelpern, supra note 83, at 23.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. See SCHWARCZ, supra note 14.
208. See id. at 5 n.2 (naming the members of the International Insolvency
Institute (III) Working Group on Sovereign Insolvencies and the CIGI ILRP
Working Group on Cross-Border and Sovereign Insolvencies who vetted the
Model Law).
209. See generally id. (stating that materials are “[a]vailable as free downloads at www.cigionline.org”).
210. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
211. See SCHWARCZ, supra note 14, app., ch. III, art. 7 (“Voting on the Plan”);
cf. supra note 194 (discussing supermajority voting).
212. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
213. See Collective Action Clauses, INT’L CAP. MKT. ASS’N, https://www
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are already included in numerous sovereign debt contracts.214
Their inclusion does not appear to raise, and may actually lower,
a debtor-state’s funding costs.215 The treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism, an intergovernmental financial institution “[committed to] ensuring the financial stability of the
euro area,”216 even mandates that supermajority-voting CACs be
included “in all new euro area [long-term] government
securities.”217
The Model Law thus fits well into this Article’s normative
framework for choosing soft law as governing law.218 Parties to
sovereign debt contracts therefore should have the right to
choose the Model Law as part of their governing law.219 Reality,
however, does not always follow scholarly norms. The legitimacy
of choosing the Model Law as governing law and its political acceptability would be increased, for example, by also gaining sup-

.icmagroup.org/Regulatory-Policy-and-Market-Practice/Primary-Markets/
primary-market-topics/collective-action-clauses/ [https://perma.cc/738D-4ZTC].
When included, such CACs would enable a specified supermajority, such as twothirds or three-quarters, of the contracting parties to amend the principal
amount, interest rate, maturities, and other critical repayment terms. Steven
L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Bankruptcy Reorganization Approach, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 956, 1003–04 (2000).
214. See, e.g., Anna Gelpern, Professor of Law, Georgetown & Senior Fellow,
Peterson Inst. for Int’l Econ., Presentation to PEIF Research Group Meeting:
Sovereign Debt Contracts and Sovereign Debt Policy (Apr. 1, 2017), https://
piie.com/system/files/documents/gelpern20170401ppt.pdf [https://perma.cc/
RVZ3-RM9L] (observing based on IMF data that supermajority-voting CACs
had been included in $1.032 trillion of sovereign bonds as of October 2016).
215. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
216. Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism, at 2, Feb. 2,
2012, T/ESM 2012-LT/en.
217. Id. art. 12(3).
218. Although the above analysis does not demonstrate that the Model Law
is manifestly fair, it does not need to because it satisfies at least one—if not
two—of the other criteria for demonstrating legitimacy. Cf. Schwarcz, supra
note 45, at 359–60 (discussing why the Model Law is not unfair to holdouts).
219. Because the Model Law focuses on sovereign debt restructuring, parties
to sovereign debt contracts may well want to choose other law (e.g., the debtorstate’s local law, or New York or English law) to apply absent a debt restructuring. This Article’s framework would accommodate that. See supra note 30 and
accompanying text.

2506

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[104:2471

port from sovereign debt stakeholders220 or from high-reputation
international organizations like UNIDROIT and UNCITRAL.221
B. INCORPORATING THE MODEL LAW BY REFERENCE
Under this Article’s framework, sophisticated parties to
business contracts should have the right to incorporate soft-law
rules into the contract by reference if (1) that incorporation by
reference does not create significant externalities (or the social
benefits of that incorporation by reference are likely to exceed
those externalities); and (2) those rules are clear and accessible.222 Parties to sovereign debt contracts invariably are sophisticated.223 The Model Law is clear and accessible.224 The provisions of the Model Law should not create significant
externalities.225 There is little doubt, therefore, that those parties should have the right to incorporate the Model Law by reference.226 Furthermore, because of its lower legitimacy
220. Pauwelyn et al., supra note 9, at 742 (observing that legitimacy “flows
from [among] other sources . . . acceptance by affected stakeholders”); supra
note 109 and accompanying text (discussing consultation with stakeholders as
part of the process for obtaining trust, and hence legitimacy).
221. Cf. supra notes 113–15 and accompanying text (analyzing the extent to
which such support would increase legitimacy and enforceability). Another way
to increase the Model Law’s legitimacy would be to persuade nations to enact
legislation explicitly authorizing the Model Law to be chosen as governing law.
See supra note 127 and accompanying text (observing that another way for soft
law to achieve legitimacy is for national law explicitly to authorize it).
222. See supra notes 186–89, 196–200 and accompanying text.
223. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 186–89 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 196–200 and accompanying text.
226. One might ask whether incorporating the Model Law by reference could
introduce such a degree of discretion as to create legitimacy concerns. For example, the Model Law creates a voting process. Although that process is unlikely to require significant discretion, its Supervisory Authority might have to
exercise minimal discretion. That exercise of discretion should not, however,
undermine legitimacy; legitimacy is created by the parties agreeing to abide by
decisions of the Supervisory Authority in accordance with the Model Law. See
Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the Empowerment of Discretionary Legal Authority: The United States Supreme Court and Abortion Rights,
43 DUKE L.J. 703, 718 (1994) (analyzing how the exercise of discretion is legitimized). In general, though, legitimacy is inversely proportional to discretion. Cf.
Bryane Michael & Say-Hak Goo, Hard Corporate Governance Law in a Soft Law
Jurisdiction (Univ. of H.K. Faculty of Law, Research Paper No. 2018/007, 2016),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers/cfm?abstract_id=3101276 [https://perma
.cc/M44M-MACR] (explaining why corporate governance rules can be enhanced
by being concrete and specific).
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requirements,227 incorporating the Model Law by reference
should be easier to accomplish than choosing the Model Law as
governing law.
To the extent parties incorporate the Model Law by reference into new sovereign debt contracts, incorporation by reference should also be as effective as choice of law. Although softlaw incorporation by reference would be subject to applicable
mandatory rules of local law, choice of law would be limited by
private international law, which respects overriding mandatory
rules of local law.228 As discussed, there may be little difference
between such mandatory rules and overriding mandatory
rules.229 Also, at least for new sovereign debt contracts, nothing
in the Model Law should contravene either category of mandatory rules. Furthermore, for reputational and other reasons, parties to sovereign-debt and other business contracts may not want
to disobey any such mandatory rules.230
However, incorporating the Model Law by reference into existing sovereign debt contracts could be more difficult than
choosing the Model Law as the governing law of those contracts.
The Model Law’s supermajority voting would contravene contracts that require unanimity to change key payment terms such
as principal amount, interest rate, and maturities.231 Although
it ultimately would be a matter of contract interpretation,
amending that unanimity requirement by incorporating the
Model Law by reference would likely itself require a unanimous
vote of the contracting parties.232
227. Compare supra Parts II.C.1–4 (discussing the legitimacy requirements
for choosing soft law as governing law), with supra notes 182–86 and accompanying text (discussing the de minimis legitimacy requirements for incorporating
soft law by reference).
228. See supra note 87 and accompanying text (distinguishing between mandatory rules and overriding mandatory rules in private international law).
229. See supra notes 178–82 and accompanying text (noting how this distinction is less important in practice).
230. See supra notes 179–81 and accompanying text (explaining the reputational reasons for following mandatory rules).
231. See supra note 213 and accompanying text (explaining the supermajority provisions promoted by the International Capital Market Association).
232. A related question would be whether the proposed amendment incorporating the Model Law by reference is specific enough to overcome the contractual language requiring unanimity for changing those terms. See Royce de R.
Barondes, Side Letters, Incorporation by Reference and Construction of Contractual Relationships Memorialized in Multiple Writings, 64 BAYLOR L. REV. 651,
709 (2012) (“Another commonly applied principle of contract interpretation is
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In contrast, the parties to an existing sovereign debt contract technically should have the right to choose the Model Law
as governing law by whatever requisite non-unanimous (e.g.,
majority) vote allows amendment of the governing law. Once
chosen as governing law, the Model Law’s supermajority voting
would, by its terms, supplant the unanimity requirement for
changing the key payment terms.233 Besides raising an issue of
first impression,234 the effectiveness of the Model Law’s supermajority voting to supplant the unanimity requirement would be
subject to any applicable overriding mandatory rule of local law,
such as sanctity of contract.235 Any such mandatory rule that
otherwise preserves unanimity, however, arguably should not
protect rent-seeking holdouts, such as an investor that purchases sovereign debt at a deep discount in order to demand payment in full lest it veto a debt restructuring.236
Although this Article uses the Model Law to illustrate soft
law’s application, it does not analyze the extent to which choosing the Model Law as governing law or incorporating it by reference could solve the problem of unsustainable sovereign debt.237
Nonetheless, that choice of law or incorporation by reference
should at least help to solve that problem and the problem of
that, where there is a conflict between a general provision and a specific provision, the latter controls.”).
233. See supra note 194 (discussing how the Model Law would allow supermajorities to change contract terms).
234. That issue could be framed in the abstract as follows. Assume a business contract requires a majority vote to amend its governing law but a unanimous vote to change certain payment terms. If the requisite majority votes to
change the governing law to one that explicitly allows supermajority voting to
change those payment terms, would that be effective to enable supermajority
voting to change those payment terms?
235. Recall that private international law respects overriding mandatory
rules of local law. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
236. See Schwarcz, supra note 45, at 374–76; see also supra note 197 (arguing that limitations on externalities should not protect rent-seeking holdouts).
Rent-seeking means seeking to increase one’s share of existing wealth without
creating new wealth. See Christina Majaski, Rent Seeking, INVESTOPEDIA (Aug.
28, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/rentseeking.asp [https://
perma.cc/3NU7-K7DP].
237. Professor John Pottow suggested at the Michigan Law Conference, for
example, that attempts to incorporate by reference or to choose the Model Law
might signal to creditors that the debtor-state implicitly contemplates a debt
restructuring, motivating them to block the attempt. Michigan Law Conference,
supra note 4. Professor Henry Gabriel also observed that such attempts might
face the hurdle that the Model Law is new, potentially unfamiliar, and lacks a
successful track record. Id.
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inadvertent variation.238 It also should help to make the Model
Law more generally accepted, which would increase its legitimacy and incrementally help to develop sovereign-debt-restructuring norms.239 Even the UCP, the leading example of soft law
having sufficient legitimacy to be chosen as governing law,240
was originally promulgated in 1933 and took decades to become
generally accepted.241
CONCLUSIONS
This Article analyzes an innovative use of soft law242: as the
governing “law” of business contracts. The topic is timely and
important because parties to financial and commercial transactions increasingly look to soft law to guide their conduct, yet soft
law’s lack of enforceability can undermine predictability. Allowing parties to choose soft law as governing law would increase
predictability by making the soft law enforceable against those
parties.
Starting with a handful of narrow precedents, the Article
builds a normative framework for choosing soft law as governing
law. As a foundation, the Article analyzes conflicts of law, party
autonomy, and the fundamental underpinnings of choice of law.
It then tempers that analysis by examining how the limits of
freedom of contracting should restrain party autonomy. Thereafter, it examines the legitimacy needed to persuade governments to enforce a soft-law choice of law. Based on that analysis,
the Article argues that sophisticated parties should have the
right to choose soft law to govern all or part of their business
contracts if three conditions are met: (1) the choice of soft law
does not create significant externalities (or its social benefits are
238. See supra notes 201–07 and accompanying text (noting arguments for
the benefits of the Model Law as part of the governing law).
239. See supra note 56 and accompanying text (arguing that the adoption of
soft law can provide an incremental and practical approach to developing
norms, which governments may later codify into hard law); supra notes 106–08
and accompanying text (explaining the importance of legitimacy in allowing enforcement).
240. See supra notes 116–19 and accompanying text (noting the widespread
acceptance of the UCP).
241. FRANS P. DE ROOY, DOCUMENTARY CREDITS 9–11 (1984).
242. Recall that soft law refers to a set of rules not yet enacted into law by
any governmental body. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (recounting
the general consensus among experts at the Michigan Law Conference); see also
supra note 11 and accompanying text (observing that using soft law as governing law would be novel).
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likely to exceed those externalities); (2) the soft law is clear and
accessible; and (3) the soft law has sufficient legitimacy by virtue
of being generally accepted, promulgated by a respected independent and unbiased organization, or manifestly fair.
The Article also compares the right to choose soft law as governing law with the right merely to incorporate that soft law by
reference into business contracts. Sophisticated parties should
have that lesser right even if the soft law lacks legitimacy, so
long as the soft law’s rules could have been written directly into
the contract and made part of its terms.
Finally, the Article applies its analysis to a real-world example of soft law: a sovereign-debt-restructuring model law proposed by an independent and non-partisan international think
tank. This helps to illustrate other differences between choice of
law and incorporation by reference. For example, soft law that is
incorporated by reference would be subject to all mandatory
rules of local law, whereas soft law chosen as governing law
would only be subject to “overriding” mandatory rules of local
law. That difference, however, can be subtle; courts do not always clearly distinguish mandatory rules of local law and overriding mandatory rules.243

243. See, e.g., supra notes 86–93, 174–82 and accompanying text (explaining
why courts may well interpret a mandatory local-law rule protecting infants as
an overriding mandatory local-law rule and noting reputational reasons why
private actors may adopt mandatory rules).
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APPENDIX A—APPLYING THE FRAMEWORKS TO OTHER
SOFT-LAW EXAMPLES
This Appendix applies the Article’s choice-of-law and incorporation-by-reference frameworks244 to other soft-law examples.
To avoid repetition, the examples assume (with one exception245)
sophisticated parties to business contracts.
A. APPLYING THE FRAMEWORKS TO THE INCOTERMS RULES
The Incoterms Rules are a codification by the ICC246 of internationally accepted definitions and rules of interpretation for
common commercial terms used in contracts for the sale of
goods.247
Parties should have the right to choose the Incoterms Rules
as governing law if (1) that choice of law does not create significant externalities (or the social benefits of that choice are likely
to exceed those externalities); (2) the Incoterms Rules are clear
and accessible; and (3) the Incoterms Rules have legitimacy by
virtue of being either generally accepted, promulgated by a respected independent and unbiased organization, or manifestly
fair. That choice of law would be unlikely to create significant
externalities because the Incoterms Rules represent internationally accepted definitions and rules of interpretation. The Incoterms Rules are clear and accessible because they have been codified by the ICC and are available online (albeit for a relatively
modest fee) from the ICC Store.248 The Incoterms Rules should
have legitimacy because (among other reasons) the ICC is a
highly respected neutral organization.249 Accordingly, parties

244. The choice-of-law framework is set forth supra notes 157–62 and accompanying text. The incorporation-by-reference framework is set forth in
Part III.C.
245. See infra note 257 and accompanying text (describing soft law written
by credit card associations).
246. Recall that the ICC is the International Chamber of Commerce, a private-sector organization. See supra notes 118–19 and accompanying text (introducing the ICC).
247. See Incoterms Rules, INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, https://iccwbo.org/
resources-for-business/incoterms-rules/ [https://perma.cc/QX4Q-SBEQ].
248. See Incoterms 2020, INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, https://2go.iccwbo
.org/incoterms-2020-eng-config+book_version-Book/ [https://perma.cc/QX4Q
-SBEQ] (stating the fee as 40.00 euros for the e-book version and 45.00 euros
for the print edition).
249. See supra notes 119, 136, 140–42 and accompanying text (explaining
the ICC’s global reputation).

2512

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[104:2471

should have the right to choose the Incoterms Rules as governing
law.
Parties should have the right to incorporate the Incoterms
Rules by reference if (1) that incorporation by reference does not
create significant externalities (or the social benefits of that incorporation by reference are likely to exceed those externalities);
and (2) those Rules are clear and accessible. The prior paragraph
already has established that the Incoterms Rules should satisfy
those conditions. Accordingly, parties should have the right to
incorporate those Rules by reference.
B. APPLYING THE FRAMEWORKS TO THE TRANSLEX-PRINCIPLES
The TransLex-Principles are a Web-based synthesis of principles and rules of transnational commercial law, collected and
organized in the form of “black-letter law” by the Center for
Transnational Law (CENTRAL) at the University of Cologne
School of Law, Germany.250
Parties should have the right to choose the TransLex-Principles as governing law if (1) that choice of law does not create
significant externalities (or the social benefits of that choice are
likely to exceed those externalities); (2) the TransLex-Principles
are clear and accessible; and (3) the TransLex-Principles have
legitimacy by virtue of being either generally accepted, promulgated by a respected independent and unbiased organization, or
manifestly fair. That choice of law would be unlikely to create
significant externalities because the TransLex-Principles are
based on lex mercatoria,251 a system of principles and rules of
behavior that has evolved consensually among merchants.252
The TransLex-Principles are clear and accessible because they
are available online, for free, and are codified as black-letter

250. See Translex-Principles, TRANS-LEX, https://www.trans-lex.org/
principles/of-transnational-law-(lex-mercatoria) [https://perma.cc/TW3G
-HSQF]. Professor Dr. Klaus Peter Berger is one of the principal scholars behind
CENTRAL. See Prof. Dr. Klaus Peter Berger, L.L.M., DEUTSCHE INST. FÜR
SCHIEDSGERICHTSBARKEIT, http://www.disarb.org/en/0/mitglieder/
selbstdarstellung/klaus-peter-berger-id51 [https://perma.cc/HZP8-UNGA].
251. See Klaus Peter Berger, The Lex Mercatoria (Old and New) and the
Translex-Principles, TRANS-LEX, https://www.trans-lex.org/the-lex-mercatoria
-and-the-translex-principles_ID8 [https://perma.cc/8W2S-GAC3].
252. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-103 cmt. 2 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N
2017). The UCP itself is an ICC codification of the lex mercatoria of international letters of credit. See Corne, supra note 117, at 55 (recognizing the UCP as
a manifestation of lex mercatoria, codifying customs, and practices of banks).
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law.253 The TransLex-Principles also should have legitimacy because they are promulgated by the University of Cologne School
of Law, a respected and neutral academic institution. Accordingly, parties should have the right to choose the TransLex-Principles as governing law.
The prior paragraph has already established that the TransLex-Principles should satisfy the conditions for incorporation by
reference. Accordingly, parties should have the right to incorporate those Principles by reference.
C. APPLYING THE FRAMEWORKS TO PROBLEMATIC EXAMPLES OF
SOFT LAW
Soft-law rules tend to be aspirational or to reflect best practices,254 but even “best practices” can be problematic.255 To show
the limits of the Article’s frameworks, consider the following
problematic examples of soft law. For each example, parties
should have the right to choose that soft law as governing law if
the framework’s three conditions are met: (1) that choice of law
does not create significant externalities (or the social benefits of
that choice are likely to exceed those externalities); (2) the soft
law is clear and accessible; and (3) the soft law has legitimacy by
virtue of being either generally accepted, promulgated by a respected independent and unbiased organization, or manifestly
fair. They also should have the right to incorporate that soft law
by reference if conditions (1) and (2) are met, without the need
to satisfy condition (3).
In the first problematic example, assume condition (1) is not
met because choosing the proposed soft law would create significant externalities (and the social benefits of that choice would
not be likely to exceed those externalities). This assumption
would be atypical for a choice of soft law in business contracts.256
It might occur, however, if the soft law is prepared by a large

253. See supra note 250.
254. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (reflecting on the consensus
opinion of soft law experts at the Michigan Law Conference).
255. See, e.g., Patricia Katopol, Maybe Best Practices Aren’t: How Survivorship Bias Skews Information Gathering and Decision-Making, 32 LIBR. LEADERSHIP & MGMT., Nov. 2017, at 1 (discussing how best practices can be biased).
256. See supra note 198 (developing this explanation more fully); see also
supra notes 196–200 and accompanying text (explaining why soft law choice of
law would be unlikely to create significant externalities).
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trade association dealing with consumers.257 In that case, regardless of the other conditions, the parties should not have the
right to choose that soft law as governing law. Nor should they
have the right to incorporate that soft law by reference.
In the second problematic example, assume condition (2) is
not met because the proposed soft law is not clear and accessible.
This might occur, for example, if that soft law is not clearly codified or not publicly available. In that case, regardless of the
other conditions, the parties should not have the right to choose
that soft law as governing law. Nor should they have the right to
incorporate that soft law by reference.
In the third problematic example, assume condition (3) is
not met because the proposed soft law lacks legitimacy. This
might occur, for example, if that soft law is neither generally accepted, promulgated by a respected independent and unbiased
organization, or manifestly fair. In that case, regardless of the
other conditions, the parties should not have the right to choose
that soft law as governing law. Nonetheless, they should have
the right to incorporate that soft law by reference into their business contract if conditions (1) and (2) are met. Incorporation by
reference does not require the legitimacy condition required for
choice of law.

257. E.g., Symeonides, supra note 167, at 126 (discussing soft-law rules
drafted by credit-card associations and applicable to credit-card holders who
had no participation or input in the drafting of those norms and observing that
it “is not unreasonable to assume that in drafting these norms, the ‘association’
was not overly solicitous of the interests of [the] credit card holders”). The above
example is the one exception to this Appendix’s assumption of sophisticated parties to business contracts. See supra text accompanying note 245.

